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Media freedom is typically viewed as crucial to democracy and development. The idea 
is that independent news media will facilitate free and fair elections and shine a 
spotlight on corruption—thereby serving as a fourth estate. Yet, political leaders 
often justify restricting media freedom on the grounds that irresponsible news 
coverage will incite political violence—potentially undermining government and in 
effect acting as a fifth column. So is media freedom a force for democracy or a 
source of civil conflict?  We hypothesize that the effect of media freedom on civil 
conflict is conditioned by a country’s level of intolerance. Specifically, we predict 
when social intolerance is low, media freedom will discourage domestic conflict 
because the tone of the news coverage will reflect the level of tolerance and 
ameliorate any inflammatory coverage.  In contrast, we predict that high levels of 
social intolerance will fuel and be fueled by inflammatory news coverage if the media 
are free, thereby promoting civil conflict. We test our hypotheses across countries 
and over time drawing from World Values and European Values Surveys and the 
Global Media Freedom Dataset and find that the combination of media freedom and 
high social intolerance is associated with increased civil conflict.  
 
* The authors’ names are listed alphabetically.  Earlier versions of this article were presented 
at the 2013 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, Illinois 
and the 2014 annual meeting of the International Communication Association in Seattle, 
Washington.  The authors wish to thank Ken Rogerson as well as the IJPP editors and four 
anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments and suggestions. We are responsible for 





In April 2002, Venezuelan news media provided round-the-clock coverage of the general strike, 
protests and political violence that led to the temporary ouster of President Hugo Chávez Frías. Yet 
these same news organizations failed to question the constitutionality of the short-lived coup and, 
for the most part, neglected to cover Chávez’ return to power (Encarnación 2002).  In fact media 
coverage of the uprising was so favorable to the opposition that some characterized it as a “media 
coup” (Castillo 2003). The clashes between the pro-Chávez and anti-Chávez demonstrators left 
nearly two-dozen people dead and hundreds more injured. Moreover, though at first glance the 
opposition appeared to be heterogeneous, in truth the divisions between the government’s 
opposition and its supporters were largely driven by deep class divisions that have been present in 
Venezuelan society “around conceptualizations of civilization and barbarism, knowledge and 
ignorance and rich and poor since its inception” (Cannon 2004: 287). Questions remain about the 
alleged collusion of the oligarchy-owned media, right-wing military and business leaders with the 
U.S. government. What is known, though, is that the news media played a crucial role in this attempt 
to undermine Venezuela’s democratically elected government.  
 
The actions of the Venezuelan media challenge the assumption shared by a wide range of 
international governmental and non-government organizations that free and independent news 
media will serve the public and promote democracy by acting as a fourth estate, providing a check 
on political and economic elites. In 2002, the Venezuelan news media conspired with the opposition 
(in this case economic elites) and functioned more like a fifth column than a fourth estate.1  In fact, 
political leaders often accuse news media of acting as a fifth column, and these same leaders 
                                                          
1 Fifth column refers to a group that attempts to undermine larger group, usually a government, from within. It is also 
used to refer to sedition. The term dates back to the Spanish Civil War and is attributed to Nationalist General Emilio 
Mola Vidal, who called his supporters within Madrid his “fifth column” as his four army columns closed in on the city. 
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sometimes justify restricting media freedom on the grounds that irresponsible news coverage will 
incite political violence and promote civil conflict. Similar claims have echoed in Rwanda, Egypt, 
India and, more recently, in Hungary.  
 
Contrary to their idealized role, news media are not always a force for good, and similarly media 
freedom does not come with guarantees of high quality news coverage or a diversity of opinions. In 
this study, we consider the conditions that might lead news media to function as a fifth column and 
instigate political violence. Specifically, we hypothesize that the effect of media on civil conflict 
depends on media freedom and is conditioned in part by a country’s level of social intolerance, 
meaning a general prejudice against group differences (these could be differences in race, religion, 
spoken language etc.). As the case of the Venezuela illustrates, independent news media can fan the 
flames of social intolerance. In 2002, there were sharp divisions in the country, with the government 
characterizing the opposition as “few in number and privileged” and the opposition (with the help 
of the media) describing Chávez and his supporters as “uncouth, unpolished, in effect uncivilised, 
poor, mixed race, without finesse, ‘sin preparación’” (Cannon 2004: 298).  
 
Thus, we predict that high levels of social intolerance will fuel and be fueled by inflammatory news 
coverage, especially if the news media are free and independent, and that this combination will serve 
to promote political violence and increase the likelihood of civil conflict.  Here we conceptualize 
civil conflict as militarized conflict between organized groups within a country, one of which is 
typically the government, which can range from small insurgencies to large-scale civil wars 
(Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015).2 Under this scenario, the news media play a critical role, 
                                                          
2 Note that this definition does not include one-sided repression.  Please see our full definition and variable specification 
in our online appendix. 
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appealing to their intolerant audience with sensationalist coverage that raises the salience of various 
grievances within society, thereby presenting an opportunity to leaders of opposition groups and/or 
extremist movements to the point that these groups are able overcome their coordination and 
collective action problems and mobilize against the government or against marginalized populations. 
In contrast, we predict that when social intolerance is low, media freedom will discourage political 
violence and thereby decrease the likelihood of civil conflict because the news media will seek 
maintain and broaden their audience with a tone and pattern of coverage that provides a balance of 
views that will appeal to a diverse audience and ameliorate any inflammatory coverage. We test our 
hypotheses across countries and over time drawing from World Values and European Values 
Surveys and the Global Media Freedom Dataset and find support for our hypothesis that media 
freedom mitigates civil conflict when social intolerance is low, and that it instigates civil conflict 
when social intolerance is high.  
 
We begin with a review of the literature on the origins of civil conflict. Then we discuss recent 
studies linking social intolerance to domestic conflict and consider how media freedom might 
encourage or discourage civil conflict. Next, we outline our research design, provide our sample and 
variable descriptions, in particular how we aggregate individual survey data to generate a country-
level measure of social intolerance. We present our results and then show how these observed 
dynamics correspond with the role of media and societal conflict within India. We conclude with a 
discussion about the implications of these findings for media policies and future research. 
 
ORIGINS OF CIVIL CONFLICT 
Civil conflict is one of the more lethal forms of political violence and represents one of the great 
challenges facing the international community.  Fearon and Laitin (2003: 75) observe that there were 
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more than 127 civil wars between 1946 and 1999 and the World Bank estimates that nearly 20 
million people have been killed in civil conflicts since 1945 (Flores and Nooruddin 2009). 
Furthermore, almost half of the civil wars experienced a recurrence of the conflict (Collier et al. 
2003). This phenomena, known as a ‘conflict trap’, is the situation in which states that experienced a 
civil conflict are more likely to experience a future conflict (Collier et al. 2003; Walter 2004), 
especially in period shortly after the original conflict ended (Collier and Sambanis 2002; Collier et al. 
2003; Elbadawi et al. 2008). Thus, it is not surprising that researchers devote significant attention to 
determining the causes and consequences of these events as well as offer numerous policy 
recommendations intended to reconstruct and reconcile the affected societies. 
 
Civil conflict has been studied in-depth, particularly over the last decade, but the causes remain 
relatively unclear due to a mixed empirical record that offers support for multiple, competing 
theories. The two primary competing arguments are grievance-based theories (Gurr 1971, Muller 
and Seligson 1987) and greed-based theories (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Collier 2000; de Soysa 
2002; Ross 2004; Lujala et al. 2005), both of which describe individual and/or group motivations to 
violently rebel against the state. Although still lacking a definitive consensus, much of recent 
research on the civil conflict onset supports the idea “that the conditions that determine the 
feasibility of rebellion are more important than those that influence motivation” (Collier et al. 2008: 
464).  However, this emerging consensus may be partially attributable to the fact that many of the 
key factors espoused by the greed- based theories are more easily quantifiable and measured.  
Grievance-based theories, on the other hand, rely more on individual and group negative 
orientations toward their respective governments and other societal groups that are considerably 
more difficult to directly measure, particularly on a mass scale (see Gurr 1971; Horowitz 1985; 
Posen 1993; Saideman 1998; Kalyvas 2006). Thus, grievance-based theories are relatively unexplored 
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and the mechanisms through which such grievances can be spread have been largely unidentified. 
This is where we propose that the media play an important role.  
 
In particular, the work on societal fractionalization, as often measured by various indicators of 
country- level demographic divisions and polarization along ethnic, religious, political, and linguistic 
dimensions, is strongly tied to the theoretical underpinning of grievance-based explanations of civil 
conflict.  As Muller and Seligson (1987) point out, even if groups have legitimate grievances against 
government, they still need to overcome impediments to collective action in order to act. The critical 
question is how some groups are able to overcome this challenge and act while others lie dormant. 
This implies that grievances must also require other mechanisms to raise their relative salience to the 
point that collective problems are overcome and groups engage in civil conflict. We contend that 
free and independent news media can provide one such mechanism, and in addition to raising the 
salience of grievances, media can also be used to overcome coordination problems (Chwe 2001).  
 
In extensive literature linking ethnicity to civil conflict, the principle causes attributed to violence 
stem from environments of societal distrust, fear, bitterness, and intolerance divided along varied 
group distinctions which exacerbate societal divisions to the point of violence (Horowitz 1985; 
Posen 1993; Lake and Rothchild 1996; Saideman 1998; Kalyvas 2006). This strongly suggests that, as 
a reflection of societal divisions, the underlying societal attitudes on trust, perceived threat, and 
intolerance play a large role in either moving societies towards or away from conflict. 
 
Despite the theoretical link between societal attitudes and conflict, empirical studies rarely use direct 
measures of attitudes to predict conflict onset.  Sambanis (2004) criticizes this disconnect between 
theorizing and empirical testing in the previous research. He points out that testing essentially micro-
7 
 
level mechanisms of mobilization with macro-level proxies for societal attitudes in cross-national 
analyses is problematic.  He advocates for more precise linkage between theorizing, measurement, 
and testing to appropriately evaluate societal-based hypotheses of civil conflict.  Of course, one 
factor previously inhibiting this approach was a lack of survey data with enough data points and 
geographic coverage to make meaningful inferences.  We contend, however, that the proliferation of 
new cross-national survey data over the last few decades now allows for this type of analysis. 
 
MEDIA, TOLERANCE AND CONFLICT 
 
News media are generally theorized to play a positive role in society, providing information that is 
crucial to the democratic process, serving as a voice for the voiceless, and holding those in power 
(especially government) accountable.3 Based on this idealized role, there has been a call to spread 
media freedom throughout the world, because news media must be free and independent from 
government control in order to have these desired effects.4 Yet, though there are some indications 
that media freedom is associated with decreased corruption (Camaj 2013), there is little empirical 
evidence to support the assumption that free media will always be a force for good.  
 
While studies have found that two countries with media freedom are less likely to engage in conflict 
with each other (Van Belle 2002; Choi and James 2006), we do not know the effect of media 
freedom on civil conflict. In fact, research on the role of media in protest and repression nexus 
suggests that under certain conditions media freedom may have an inflammatory effect rather than a 
                                                          
3 This idealized view is spread primarily by advocates for media freedom and is not always echoed by scholars. In recent 
years there have been several works critiquing the failure of the news media to serve as a fourth estate, especially the U.S. 
and U.K.  See for example Edwards and Cromwell (2009) and Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston (2007). 
4 Following Van Belle (1997) we define media freedom as the ability of news media to criticize government. This 




pacifying effect, especially at the domestic level. Whitten-Woodring (2009) finds that in the absence 
of democracy, media freedom is associated with increased repression, probably in response to 
protest. Stein (2013: 8) proposes “the mainstream media serve as opposition leaders’ barometer of 
government tolerance for public displays of dissent,” such that increased critical reporting of 
government signals an opportunity for protest movements. Of course, government crackdowns on 
journalists who engage in such critical reporting can also discourage protest (Whitten-Woodring and 
James 2012). Kim, Whitten-Woodring and James (2015) find that if people believe government 
repression will ultimately fail, people will protest and news media will engage in watchdog reporting 
even in the absence of media freedom.  Thus, there is evidence that watchdog reporting is associated 
with protest, and although watchdog reporting may sometimes occur in the absence of media 
freedom (in environments where criticizing the government is dangerous for journalists), we argue it 
is far more likely to occur when government either loosens or loses some control of media. 
Additionally, news media may sometimes be directly associated with opposition movements, in 
which case the more free the news media are, the more likely opposition affiliated news media will 
facilitate mobilization against the government.  Given that media freedom and watchdog reporting 
can facilitate protest, it follows that media freedom and shifts in media freedom may lead to other 
types of domestic conflict and political violence, in particular civil conflict.5 
 
We posit that there are several ways in which free and independent news media can be used to 
increase the chances of civil conflict. First, inflammatory framing of news events can widen existing 
divisions in a society. Second, the use of language, especially derogatory labels and classifications of 
certain groups in the news can have a dehumanizing effect, which in turn weakens established social 
                                                          
5 We are arguing that the interaction of media freedom and social intolerance increases the likelihood of civil conflict, but 
we do acknowledge that it probably has little or no influence on civil conflict that is driven by anti-corruption 
movements (unless the dissenters are members of a marginalized group). 
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norms against violence. Third, leaders can use media to mobilize and coordinate groups, letting 
them know when and where there will be opportunities for action. To be clear, we are not claiming 
that it is necessarily journalists who are inciting the political violence; in many cases it is their 
sources—usually political elites—who are using the news media to this end.  
 
First and foremost, through framing, in particular focusing on the more sensational, frightening or 
violent aspects of a group’s grievance, media can exacerbate societal divisions by raising the relative 
salience of the grievance to a mass scale, thereby, assisting groups in overcoming their collective 
action problems; a notion that converges well with earlier theorizing on grievances and civil conflict 
(see Muller and Seligson 1987). Although the previous research on ethnic and civil conflict suggests 
several different individual attitudes likely to influence the likelihood of conflict, we argue that social 
intolerance may have the most serious short- and long-term influence on the likelihood of civil 
conflict.  Conceptualized here as an individual’s degree of prejudice against various groups within 
society, social intolerance has long been associated with damaging social and political consequences, 
such as political violence and repression, that negatively affect transitional, post conflict societal 
relations (see Gibson and Gouws 2003).6  As Gibson (2007: 327) notes, “[t]o the extent that a 
political culture emphasizes conformity and penalizes those with contrarian ideas, little tolerance 
exists, and the likelihood of political repression is high.”  Under these conditions, grievances against 
the government by various targeted groups may deepen to the point of violent action, especially if 
the news media’s frames amplify these grievances.  
 
                                                          
6 Though recent studies have shown that political polarization can lead to limitations on media freedom (see Kellam and 
Stein forthcoming), we note that there is extensive public opinion literature indicating that social (in)tolerance is distinct 
from political tolerance and political polarization (see in particular Gibson 2013).  
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Intolerance can often serve as a partial manifestation of a society’s level of fractionalization, 
particularly along social dimensions. Thus, mass intolerance can often result in the exclusion or 
diminishment of opposition groups from participating in the political system and targeted 
exclusionary policies (Gibson 2007, 2008).  Furthermore, news media have the potential to reinforce 
these prejudices through the use of demeaning and dehumanizing language to describe groups, 
thereby rendering their marginalization more acceptable. Gibson (1998) argues that similar 
manifestations of intolerance may be a slippery slope leading to the suppression of minority rights, 
which would further strengthen grievances by those groups against the government.   
 
All told, mass societal intolerance creates or exacerbates existing grievances of social and political 
groups against either the government or other relevant groups within society.  As Gurr (1971) and 
others have observed, if these grievances are salient enough to overcome collective action 
problems7, then groups are more likely to rebel and cause civil conflict within their respective 
countries. This contention is further supported by the studies on ethnic conflict, which demonstrate 
that these environments of intolerance and distrust can spur groups to act out violently within 
society and, in extreme cases, rebel (see Horowitz 1985; Posen 1993; Lake and Rothchild 1996; 
Saideman 1998; Kalyvas 2006).  In a study on the former Yugoslavia, Dyrstad (2012: 825) observes 
that attitudes of ethnic intolerance in 1989 were higher in those regions that would subsequently 
experience ethnic civil war during the country’s dissolution than those that remained more peaceful.   
 
Therefore, we expect that higher levels of societal intolerance to increase the likelihood of civil 
conflict within a country. Moreover, in a free media environment, media can be used to heighten 
                                                          
7 A collective action problem is basically a conflict between individual and group interests. In regards to protest or 
rebellion, individuals may stand to benefit from a group’s actions, whether they participate or not, but the group will not 
succeed if individuals seek to minimize their costs and maximize their benefits by refusing to join the group’s actions. 
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and amplify social intolerance, and mass media and now social media can be used to mobilize and 
coordinate protest and collective violence (Bailard 2015; Warren 2015). Thus, we expect the 
interaction of media freedom and social intolerance to increase the chances of political violence in 
general and civil conflict in particular. 
 
One likely mechanism through which the interaction of media freedom with social intolerance could 
promote civil conflict is the formation of echo chambers. Jamieson and Cappella (2008: 76) describe 
the echo chamber effect in the context of the conservative movement in the United States stating 
that “the metaphor of an echo chamber captures the ways messages are amplified and reverberate 
through the conservative opinion media. We mean to suggest a bounded, enclosed media space that 
has the potential to both magnify the messages delivered within it and insulate them from rebuttal.” 
We posit that such echo chambers can form in any media system around any ideology that is 
strongly present in a given society, provided media organizations are free to publish or broadcast 
news and opinion. Moreover we posit that echo chambers are more likely to form in scenarios 
where there is a high degree of social intolerance because there are likely to be commercial pressures 
on the media to produce news and opinion that cater to those who are intolerant. Independent news 
media compete for audiences and people tend to gravitate toward news sources that reflect their 
ideological views. Therefore, if there is a substantial group of people who share an ideology and an 
intolerance, then it follows that it might be profitable for some media outlets in each medium 
(including newspapers, radio, television and online media) to cater to this group. Consequently, the 
availability of multiple sources of news media that reflect the same ideology, quote each other and 
cover news events with the same frames and dehumanizing language will reinforce the audience’s 
intolerance, and at the same time block out alternative views. Thus, an echo chamber both attracts 
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those who are intolerant and intensifies their intolerance. And once formed, an echo chamber can 
serve as a mobilizing device. 
 
The 1994 Rwandan Genocide is perhaps the most dramatic example of the use media to promote 
civil conflict. Although the media environment in Rwanda was not functionally free, in the early 
1990s as the government took steps to move to a multiparty system, media restrictions were relaxed 
and there was a dramatic increase in privately owned newspapers, from 12 in 1990 to more than 60 
in 1991, (US Department of State 1992).  Some of these papers were extremist and anti-Tutsi (Alexis 
and Mpambara 2003). Because of widespread illiteracy, most Rwandans relied on radio for news, 
information, and entertainment. In this case though, the culprit was not independent or opposition-
controlled media, but rather state-controlled radio that turned Hutu against Tutsi. The radio stations 
used to mobilize the Hutu included the state-controlled station Radio Rwanda and Radio-Television 
Libre des Milles Collines (RTLM), which was established as private enterprise, an alternative to 
Radio Rwanda, and was supposed to serve as a voice of the people, but was in fact backed by the 
ruling elite (Des Forges 2007).  
 
From late October [1993] on, RTLM repeatedly and forcefully underlined many of the themes 
developed for years by the extremist print media, including the inherent differences between Hutu 
and Tutsi, the foreign origin of Tutsi and, hence, their lack of rights to claim to be Rwandan, the 
disproportionate share of wealth and power held by Tutsi and the horrors of past Tutsi rule. It 
continually stressed the need to be alert to Tutsi plots and possible attacks and demanded that Hutu 
prepare to ‘defend’ themselves against the Tutsi threat (Des Forges 2007: 45).  Additionally, radio 
announcers dehumanized the Tutsi through their use of derogatory language to describe them: the 
term “inyenzi” (meaning cockroach) was used repeatedly and interchangeably with “Tutsi” (Des 
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Forges 2007). Ironically, in response to international criticism of the RTLM broadcasts, Rwandan 
President Habyarimana defended the station’s right to free speech (Des Forges 2007).  
 
Again, the use of radio in the Rwanda was arguably a case of state-controlled media promoting 
genocide, but the tactics used in Rwanda could certainly be adopted by independent news media, 
seeking to appeal to (or even mobilize) an intolerant group. For example in 2010 in Uganda, the 
weekly tabloid Rolling Stone (no affiliation with the US magazine) appealed to the country’s 
homophobic, running a front page story on the alleged dangers posed by homosexuals, complete 
with pictures of 100 people it claimed were “Uganda’s Top Homos” and a banner reading “Hang 
Them.” Though gay rights activists successfully sued the editors of the newspaper, one of the 
activists, David Kato, whose picture appeared on the tabloid’s front page was murdered shortly after 
winning the court case. While the Rolling Stone incident led to crime rather than civil conflict, this 
case does reveal the potential for media to instigate violence. 
 
In sum, we predict that media are more likely to take on this instigating role when social intolerance 
is high. In contrast, if social intolerance is low we expect media freedom will serve to mitigate 
conflict. In this scenario, there is little or no profit for news media in catering to an intolerant 
audience. As a result, news media will benefit commercially by appealing to a broad audience and 
presenting multiple points of view. Therefore we propose that in a highly tolerant society, media will 
be unlikely to form echo chambers, and people will be exposed to multiple perspectives through 
news media. 
H1:  The effect of media freedom on civil conflict is conditional on the level of social tolerance such that:  a) 
media freedom with low social tolerance increases the likelihood of civil conflict and; b) media freedom with 




SAMPLE AND VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
In this study, we are primarily interested in how social intolerance and media freedom influence the 
likelihood of civil conflict. The conventional empirical approach is to examine cross-national, cross-
sectional data over time.  Yet, those approaches have typically relied on imprecise proxies for 
societal intolerance due to data limitations.  Here we generate a more theoretically and conceptually 
appropriate measure by aggregating individual attitudes of societal intolerance into country averages 
and include those in a standard cross-national model of civil conflict.    To do so, we rely on cross-
national survey data collected from multiple waves of the World Values and European Values 
Surveys that span from 1990 to 2008 (European Values Study Group & World Values Survey 
Association 2011).8   
 
By using a direct measure of individual social tolerance instead of country-level proxy variables, we 
greatly improve the precision of the empirical modeling of our proposed theoretical relationships. 
However, using direct measures of intolerance is not without tradeoffs and presents a different set 
of methodological challenges.  Although the number of cross-national surveys has increased 
tremendously over the last two decades, there is still only limited survey coverage available across 
countries and, in particular, time.  Additionally, cross-national surveys often lack of consistent 
questions across all countries or the question wording varies across surveys.  Here we ameliorate 
some of these problems by using the World Values Survey, which offers a global coverage of 
surveys and includes a series of social tolerance questions relatively consistent across countries 
within each wave of surveys and across multiple waves over time. 
                                                          
8 The World Values and European Values Surveys are global survey projects conducted over dozens of countries across 




For our analyses below, our sample size is 207 country-years based on surveys of 80 different 
countries from 1981 to 2008.9  In Table 1, we list the countries and the survey years used in our 
sample.  Of course, drawing a sample from a population of surveys carries an increased risk of bias 
in our analyses (for similar discussions, see Hutchison and Gibler 2007; Hutchison and Johnson 
2011). Although the coverage of our surveys is global, the country sample selected for surveys is not 
truly representative even though it varies widely in level of development, political institutions, 
region, and ethnic diversity. Survey countries tend to be more populous, more democratic, more 
internally stable, and less prone to civil conflict than a truly representative sample. This is due to the 
increased difficulty of conducting nationally representative surveys in poorer or less internally stable 
countries as well as the greater danger posed to the interviewers. In short, this sample selection 
favors stability and internally peaceful countries. However, while we acknowledge this inherent 
sample bias, we are not as troubled by its implications for our results below.  In fact, given the 
higher relatively level of stability within this sample, it is strongly biased against finding results linking 
social intolerance to civil conflict and, thus, represents a stronger test for our hypothesis. 
 
***TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Dependent Variable 
Internal Armed Conflict.  Our dependent variable is civil conflict. As we discuss above, civil conflicts 
are militarized conflicts within a country between the government and organized groups or, in some 
instances, between distinct sub-state organized groups.  Civil conflicts can range from large-scale 
civil wars to low-level insurgency movements (Fearon and Laitin 2003).  For our measure of civil 
                                                          
9 Due to missing data for some our key variables, our sample size varies between 207 and 193 country years depending 
on the model specification as indicated in Table 2. 
16 
 
conflict, we rely on the internal armed conflict indicator from the UCPD/PRIO Armed Conflict 
dataset, version 4-2015 (Gleditsch et al. 2002). This dataset includes measures of lower-intensity 
armed civil conflicts in addition to large-scale civil wars and is commonly used throughout the 
empirical literature on civil conflict (see Bartusevicius 2016).10 In this dataset, an internal armed 
conflict is “a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of 
armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at 
least 25 battle-related deaths” (Pettersson and Wallensteen 2015: 1). In this study, our dichotomous 
civil conflict measure indicates whether that sample country experienced at least one civil conflict in 
the year following the survey. For instance, if a survey was conducted in 1995, this measure would 
indicate if that country experienced a civil conflict in 1996. 
 
Independent Variables 
Social Intolerance. In this study, we measure societal intolerance using several indicators of individual 
prejudice.  As Gibson (2007) notes, individual prejudice is a primary measure of social intolerance 
and distinct from political tolerance (also see Gibson 2013). The World Values and European Values 
Surveys employ an extensive social tolerance battery that is relatively consistent both within and 
across the various waves of surveys. This battery presents respondents with a list of various groups 
of people and asks the respondent to indicate which of those groups they would not like to have as a 
neighbor.11 Although the groups on this list can vary from country to country and wave to wave, we 
construct an additive intolerance index for each individual from several groups that consistently 
appear in almost every list of choices: people of a different race and immigrants.  For each 
                                                          
10 Although this civil conflict indicator is more comprehensive compared to more traditional civil war indicators, it still 
underestimates the full extent of civil conflict throughout the world because many low-intensity insurgencies do not 
meet the 25 battle death threshold over the course of a year (Buhaug et al. 2009).    
11 For these items, respondents are asked:  “On this list are various groups of people. Could you please sort out any that 
you would not like to have as neighbors?” 
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component, individuals were coded 1 if they indicated that they would not like that group as a 
neighbor and 0 if they did not. Thus, our social intolerance index ranges from 0 (tolerant) to 2 
(intolerant). We then aggregate all of the responses to generate a mean for each survey to include in 
our civil conflict models. In our sample, the social intolerance index ranges from 0.03 (Argentina, 
1984) to 1.39 (Bangladesh, 2002) with a mean of 0.32.12  
 
Media Freedom.  To measure media freedom, we use the Global Media Freedom Dataset, an updated 
version of a definition-driven data set (Van Belle 1997; Whitten-Woodring and Van Belle 2014; 
Whitten-Woodring and Van Belle forthcoming). The definition is explicitly political.  Media are free 
if media outlets are able to safely criticize government and other elites, and thereby serve as an arena 
for political competition.  Though there are other measures of media freedom, only the GMFD 
offers a simple coding scheme that is consistent over time and across countries. The GMFD coding 
scheme is defined by thresholds and based on a clear and simple definition of media freedom.  In 
comparison, the Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders indices use coding schemes that 
have changed over time and are based primarily on identifying media restrictions rather than on a 
definition of media freedom. Both indices identify the status of the news media for each country-
year, but these statuses are determined by cut-offs in the scale rather than by thresholds (Whitten-
Woodring and Van Belle forthcoming).13  
 
In the Global Media Freedom Dataset, the media environment for each country is placed in one of 
the following categories:  
                                                          
12 Although we aggregate the individual-level index to generate an aggregate mean for each survey, the additive index has 
a Cronbach’s alpha score of 0.65.  Furthermore, factor analysis reveals that both of the variables loaded on to the factor 
above 0.60.  A factor score generated from this loading correlated with our index at 0.99.  Thus, we are confident that 
our measure is tapping into a similar individual dynamic. 
13 For more information comparing the various media freedom indices see Whitten-Woodring and Van Belle 2014. 
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 Free: Countries where criticism of government and officials is a common 
part of the political dialogue  
 
 Imperfectly Free: Countries where social, legal, or economic costs related to 
the criticism of government or officials limits public criticism, but 
investigative journalism and criticism of major policy failing can and does 
occur 
 
 Not Free: Countries where it is not possible to safely criticize the 




This is a categorical coding rather than interval scale; the difference between media coded imperfectly 
free and media coded not free is far more substantial than the differences between those coded free and 
those coded imperfectly free. Because of the bimodal nature of these data, we collapse categories free 
and imperfectly free to form free media.  
 
Control Variables 
In the analyses below, we rely on a relatively standard set of control variables for modeling the 
likelihood of civil conflict (see Fearon and Laitin 2003).  The subsequent models include measures 
for ethnic fractionalization, inequality (GINI), unemployment, youth population, rugged terrain, oil rents, and prior 
conflict, all of which we expect to increase the probability of conflict.  To account for factors shown 
to decrease the likelihood of civil conflict, we also include measures of economic development (GDP – 
PPP), democratic longevity, and executive constraints.  In the interest of conserving space, we include full 






Since our dependent variable is binary, we use logistic regression to estimate the effects of our 
explanatory variables in the analyses that follow.  In Table 2, we present our six models to 
demonstrate the effects of social intolerance and media freedom on the likelihood of civil conflict.  
Recall our dependent variable indicates whether the country experiences a civil conflict in the year 
following the survey.  In Model 1, we begin by estimating only the effects of our control variables on 
civil conflict.  Not surprisingly, we find that rugged terrain is positively correlated with the onset of 
civil conflict; a finding that corresponds with Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) seminal findings (also see 
Hendrix 2011).  We also observe that ethnic fractionalization has a nonmonotonic effect on civil 
conflict.14  That is, the likelihood of conflict is lowest in countries with very low and very high levels 
of ethnic fractionalization.  This curvilinear relationship is very much in line with previous 
predictions and findings (see Horowitz 1985; Esteban and Ray 2008).  Overall, these results do not 
reveal any big surprises and the direction of our coefficients largely corresponds with previous civil 
conflict studies despite our truncated sample.  This similarity to previous findings on civil conflict 
adds confidence that our sample can yield inferences that are generalizable.15 
 
We introduce our main explanatory variables, social intolerance and media freedom, separately in 
Models 2 and 3.  In these models, we assess the unconditional effects of each variable on the 
likelihood of civil conflict.  As expected, we find that higher levels of social intolerance increase the 
likelihood of civil conflict in Model 2. That is, countries with higher levels of social intolerance are 
more likely to experience civil conflict in the year following the survey than those countries with 
lower levels of social intolerance; a finding that is consistent with multiple causal pathways but also 
                                                          
14 In the interest of conserving space, we display the predicted impact of ethnic fractionalization on the likelihood of 
civil conflict in Figure A1 of the online appendix. 
15 As a further robustness check, we re-estimated our models substituting our continuous democracy and executive 
constraints variables with a combined democracy/autocracy Polity score from the Polity IV dataset.  This substitution 
did not change our substantive findings.  These results can be found in Table A1 in our online appendix. It is worth 




correspondent with the modal expectation on this relationship (see Hutchison 2014).  To get a sense 
of the substantive impact of a country’s average intolerance on the likelihood of civil conflict, we 
plot this unconditional effect in Figure 1.  It reveals that a country’s social intolerance has a strong 
substantive effect as the probability of civil conflict increases from a mere 7% at no intolerance to 
46% at the highest level of intolerance found in our sample.  Model 2 also reveals that change in 
unemployment actually reduces the likelihood of civil conflict; a finding that we observe in Models 
4-6.  Although this finding does not match our expectations, it is similar to previous empirical 
findings that show a similar effect (Benmelech et al 2010; Berman et al. 2011). 
 
In Model 3, we evaluate only the effect of media freedom on conflict. Here we do not observe a 
statistically significant unconditional effect between media freedom and the likelihood of a civil 
conflict. This result does not support the normative expectation that, in general, media freedom 
would reduce the likelihood of civil conflict. Nevertheless, we argue that the effect of media 
freedom on civil conflict is likely to be more complex and conditional on other factors, particularly 
social intolerance.   
 
***FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
In Model 4, we include both intolerance and media freedom in the same model.  Once again, this 
specification evaluates their respective unconditional effects on civil conflict likelihood.  Here we 
show generally the same relationships that we observe in Models 2 and 3.  We once again see that 
social intolerance increases the likelihood of civil conflict while media freedom has no statistically 
significant effect. Overall, this model supports our previous findings on the unconditional effects 




Although prior conflict is one of the strongest predictors of civil conflict, we chose to omit this 
variable in our previous models due to concern that including a lag of the dependent variable on the 
right side of the regression model will likely mask the effects of the independent variables that are of 
great theoretical interest (Achen 2000).  This is especially true for our analyses here because of our 
small sample size and brief time span.  In Model 5, we include the prior conflict variable into model 
and find that some of our observed effects disappear, including social intolerance and rugged terrain.  
As expected, prior conflict is a strong predictor of civil conflict.  
  
Our final test in Model 6 examines the conditional relationship involving intolerance and media 
freedom.  Recall that we expect that intolerance combined with media freedom should actually serve 
to further exacerbate societal divisions and, thus, increase the likelihood of conflict.  We find strong 
support for this hypothesis in the model after interacting intolerance and media freedom.  In Model 
6, the parameter estimate for the media freedom x social intolerance interaction term is positive and 
statistically significant.  Substantively, this result indicates that higher levels of social intolerance 
combined with media freedom increase the likelihood of civil conflict.  We also find mixed results 
from the remaining component variables. The parameter estimate for the media freedom variable is 
negative and statistically significant. This result signifies that media freedom actually reduces the 
likelihood of civil conflict but only in more tolerant societies. This finding is in-line with the more 
traditional depiction of media as a positive force for society.   The parameter estimate for social 
intolerance, on the other hand, is not statistically significant. This suggests that societal intolerance 
does not exert a strong influence on the likelihood of civil conflict in a country with restricted 
media.  Intuitively, this non-finding makes sense as countries with restricted media tend to come 
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from more repressive states.  Effective state repression reflects a stronger capacity to ameliorate the 
ability of potential rebel groups to organize and mount effective campaigns against governments. 
 
The interactive effects of media freedom and social intolerance are more easily interpreted 
graphically. Figure 2 depicts the effects of Free and Not Free Media on the probability of civil 
conflict as social intolerance increases. Once again, we find strong substantive effects relating to 
country-level intolerance but now we can show the impact of free media in moderating this 
dynamic.  Here we can see that when media are free and intolerance is low, the probability of civil 
conflict is close to 5%, but as intolerance increases the probability of civil conflict increases to about 
84%. In contrast, when media are not free and intolerance is low the probability of civil conflict is 
about 31%, but as intolerance increases, the probability of conflict decreases to about 3%. 
 
***FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE*** 
 
Overall, our analysis offers compelling support for much of our argument.  As anticipated, societal 
intolerance is generally linked to a higher probability of civil conflict.  Furthermore, our results 
indicate that this relationship is moderated by the country’s level of media freedom, but that media 
freedom by itself does not have an independent effect on the likelihood of conflict.  All in all, these 
findings are supportive of a more grievance-based approach to explaining civil conflict. Our results 
also offer more direct evidence that intolerant societies are more likely to experience civil conflict, 
particularly under conditions of media freedom.  To put our statistical findings in context and to 
demonstrate the possible causal mechanisms, we provide a detailed case illustration of India in 
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section 3 of our online appendix.16  In the case of the 2002 Hindu-Muslim violence, we find some 
evidence of an echo chamber within the Gujarat media, in which the two most popular newspapers 
employed inflammatory frames and dehumanizing language, and the cable television stations carried 
speeches by local politicians that could have been perceived as a mobilizing call for retaliatory 
violence against the Muslim population.  
 
CONCLUSION 
We began this paper with the goal of examining the conditions that could lead free and independent 
news media to instigate political violence, in particular civil conflict. The answer—according to our 
findings here—is that the effect of media freedom on civil conflict depends on social tolerance. In 
the most tolerant societies, media freedom is associated with decreased probability of civil conflict, 
but in more intolerant societies, media freedom is linked with increased probability of civil conflict. 
The case of India provides some insight as to how this can happen, through the media’s use of 
inflammatory frames, dehumanizing language and the formation of echo chambers. Additionally, the 
case of the Hindu-Muslim violence in 2002 shows that politicians will sometimes use news media to 
inflame existing prejudices for political gain and incite violence against marginalized groups. 
 
These findings suggest that foreign assistance aimed at establishing media freedom in non-
democratic and developing countries may not have the desired effect, and could promote domestic 
conflict in countries with societal intolerance.  Similarly, these findings also indicate that controlled 
media may decrease the chances of civil conflict in countries with high levels of social intolerance.  It 
is not our intention to defend the decisions of certain governments to control media. Instead we 
                                                          




posit that if the goal is to have a free and independent press that can serve as a fourth estate, then 
certain conditions need to be in place, in particular, a minimal level of social tolerance.  
 
The problem of media freedom and social intolerance is similar to the ‘hen-and-egg’ problem of 
democracy—democracy will not work unless certain conditions are in place and it is difficult to have 
those conditions in place in the absence of democracy.  Though it is difficult to pin-point which 
comes first, social intolerance or inflammatory media, we posit that it is mostly likely the case that 
news media are amplifying prejudices that are deeply ingrained in society. It is also true that biased 
media could emerge in highly polarized and socially intolerant countries (this could be a promising 
area for future research).  Here we have proposed that in an intolerant society, there are likely to be 
commercial and political incentives for independent media to provide news and information that 
caters to those who share a particular ideology and this in turn might reinforce their intolerance and 
create an opportunity for leaders of opposition groups to mobilize. Yet this tactic is not limited to 
the opposition. The case of India demonstrates that mainstream political elites may also use 
independent news media to inflame intolerance. Thus, in highly intolerant societies, free and 
independent news media can reinforce intolerance and raise the salience of grievances, which in turn 
can be used by political leaders (opposition or mainstream) to provoke political violence. 
 
Certainly there is a history of governments using the potential for media to instigate political 
violence as an excuse for controlling media. In present day Rwanda, journalists have been 
imprisoned on charges of inciting violence and defaming President Paul Kagame. In 2010 the 
Hungarian government adopted new media laws that established a Media Council (made up of 
members of Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s Fidesz party) to regulate content of broadcast, print and 
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online media. The Media Council has the authority to punish media outlets “for ‘inciting hatred’ 
against individuals, nations, communities, minorities, or even majorities. The council is called to levy 
fines or suspend outlets for ‘unbalanced’ or ‘immoral’ reporting,” (Freedom House 2012). Thus, 
there is evidence that governments perceive the potential for news media to play the role of a fifth 
column—supporting and facilitating the opposition or extremist groups existing within a country’s 
borders. 
 
In an intolerant society, policies prohibiting hate speech and/or incitement of violence offer an 
alternative to controlled media. In Germany and France there are policies against the use of symbols 
and language associated with the Nazi regime and anti-Semitism.  Laws against hate speech and 
incitement of violence may well prevent news media from inflaming social intolerance, but limiting 
speech and media criticism can be a slippery slope.  Many countries prohibit criticism of political 
leaders and/or ruling families, sometimes in the name of national security. A case in point, in 
September 2015, the printer of the international edition of the New York Times in Thailand refused to 
print the paper because the front page featured a story about the King’s declining health calling into 
question the future of the Thai Monarchy, a violation of Thailand’s lèse-majesté laws, which 
criminalize insulting the monarchy. Thailand is not alone, in recent years the International Press 
Institute has campaigned against the desacato or “contempt of authority” laws in place in a number of 
Caribbean countries, claiming that these policies are a serious threat to media freedom (Griffen 
2012). Thus, any policies prohibiting speech must be carefully tailored so that they prevent 
incitement while allowing news media to criticize government and other political and economic 
elites. In short, preventing the media from acting as a fifth column while allowing it to serve as a 
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Table 1:  Sample of Surveyed Countries and Years
Country Years Country Years
Albania 1998, 2002 Ky rgy z Republic 2003
Algeria 2002 Latv ia 1996, 1999
Argentina 1984, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2006 Lithuania 1997 , 1999
Armenia 1997 Macedonia 1998, 2001
Australia 1981, 1995, 2005 Malay sia 2006
Austria 1990, 1999 Mali 2007
Azerbaijan 1997 Mexico 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005
Bangladesh 1996, 2002 Moldova 1996, 2002, 2006
Belarus 1996, 2000 Morocco 2001, 2007
Belgium 1981, 1990, 1999 Netherlands 1981, 1990, 1999, 2006
Brazil 1991, 1997 , 2006 New Zealand 1998, 2004
Bulgaria 1997 , 1999, 2006 Nigeria 1990, 1995, 2000
Burkina Faso 2007 Norway 1982, 1990, 1996, 2008
Canada 1982, 1990, 2000, 2006 Peru 1996, 2001, 2008
Chile 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005 Philippines 1996, 2001
China 1990, 1995, 2001, 2007 Poland 1989, 1990, 1997 , 1999, 2005
Colombia 1997 , 1998, 2005 Portugal 1990, 1999
Croatia 1996 Romania 1993, 1998, 1999, 2005
Czech Republic 1998, 1999 Russia 1990, 1995, 1999, 2006
Denmark 1981, 1990, 1999 Rwanda 2007
Dominican Republic 1996 Serbia 2006
Egy pt 2000, 2008 Slovak Republic 1998, 1999
El Salvador 1999 Slovenia 1992, 1995, 1999, 2005
Estonia 1996, 1999 South Africa 1990, 1996, 2001, 2007
Finland 1990, 1996, 2000, 2005 South Korea 1982, 1990, 1996, 2001, 2005
France 1981, 1990, 1999, 2006 Spain 1981, 1990, 1995, 1999, 2000, 2007
Georgia 2008 Sweden 1982, 1990, 1996, 1999, 2006
Germany 1990, 1997 , 1999, 2006 Switzerland 1989, 1996, 2007
Ghana 2007 Tanzania 2001
Greece 1999 Thailand 2007
Guatemala 2005 Trinidad and Tobago 2006
Hungary 1998, 1999 Turkey 1990, 1996, 2001, 2007
India 1990, 1995, 2001, 2006 Uganda 2001
Indonesia 2001, 2006 Ukraine 1996, 1999, 2006
Iran 2000, 2007 United Kingdom 1981, 1990, 1998, 1999, 2006
Ireland 1981, 1990, 1999 United States 1982, 1990, 1995, 1999, 2006
Israel 2001 Uruguay 1996, 2006
Italy 1981, 1990, 1999, 2005 Venezuela 1996, 2000
Japan 1981, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 Vietnam 2001, 2006




Table 2:  The Likelihood of Civil Conflict One Year After Survey
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Ethnic Fractionalization 10.519***  9.560** 10.299** 10.021** 13.784* 29.988*
 (3.246)  (3.434)  (3.295)  (3.630)  (5.743)  (11.869)
Ethnic Fractionalization2 -9.043** -8.164* -8.857* -8.591* -12.811* -29.768**
 (3.435)  (3.790)  (3.469)  (3.876)  (5.757)  (10.971)
GDP - PPP (log) -0.347 -0.142 -0.333 -0.131 -0.210 -0.510
 (0.339)  (0.358)  (0.336)  (0.363)  (0.516)  (0.582)
GINI  0.041  0.026  0.044  0.020 -0.081 -0.137
 (0.043)  (0.048)  (0.045)  (0.050)  (0.080)  (0.087)
Change in Unemployment -0.022 -0.031* -0.022 -0.030* -0.035* -0.048**
 (0.024)  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.019)
Youth (%)  6.919  6.636  6.813  6.996 11.519 25.108**
 (5.957)  (5.883)  (6.010)  (6.231)  (7.480)  (9.543)
Continuous Democracy  0.325  0.161  0.346  0.132  0.159  0.138
 (0.232)  (0.258)  (0.237)  (0.262)  (0.383)  (0.331)
Executive Constraints  0.065  0.174  0.090  0.143 -0.052 -0.012
 (0.226)  (0.246)  (0.233)  (0.249)  (0.321)  (0.320)
Rugged Terrain  0.021*  0.021*  0.020  0.023*  0.008  0.020
 (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.013)  (0.014)
Oil Rents  0.025  0.024  0.023  0.027  0.013  0.060
 (0.035)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.032)  (0.034)  (0.041)
Prior Conflict  5.370***  5.688***
 (0.853)  (1.130)
Social Intolerance  2.336*  2.617*  1.225 -4.988
 (1.031)  (1.232)  (1.601)  (3.194)
Media Freedom -0.303  0.430 -0.424 -6.103**
 (0.677)  (0.915)  (1.176)  (2.215)
Social Intolerance X Media Freedom 14.054**
 (5.063)
Constant -6.166 -8.323 -6.251 -8.639 -5.257 -14.116*
 (3.888)  (4.303)  (3.806)  (4.540)  (5.751)  (6.956)
N 207 193 207 193 193 193
Logistic regression predicting whether civil conflict will occur in the year following the survey.
Robust standard errors are listed in parantheses.
* p<0.05,  ** p<0.01,  *** p<0.001
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